伽达默尔和利科对“真理”和“方法”两个概念及其内在联系的理解有着明显的分歧。利科认为伽达默尔的诠释学导致了真理与方法的断裂，而伽达默尔指出利科倡导的方法不能达到一种更普遍的诠释学真理。本文指出，二者的分歧体现的是海德格尔存在论真理观的两种不同发展路径：伽达默尔以柏拉图的对话为范式，强调诠释学对话中开显出来的理解的真理；利科以对文本的结构分析为基础，关注以反思为中介达到的自我理解的真理。利科的理解-说明辩证法和伽达默尔的问-答辩证法都远离绝对真理，强调理解的历史性和诠释学经验的开放性。两位哲学家都试图让诠释学从海德格尔彻底的基础存在论回到具体的精神科学，并从不同角度为精神科学的独特真理提供了辩护。

There exist remarkable differences between Gadamer's and Ricoeur's understandings of the concepts "truth" and "method." Ricoeur believes that Gadamer's hermeneutics brings about the disjuncture of hermeneutic truth, while Gadamer holds that Ricoeur's structuralist method cannot integrate the conflicts of interpretations into a unified ontology. This paper points out that both philosophers develop their theories of truth on the basis of Heidegger's hermeneutical ontology, but in different ways. Gadamer focuses on the truth of understanding disclosed in the event of hermeneutic dialogue, while Ricoeur emphasizes the truth of self-understanding mediated by hermeneutic reflection. Both philosophers keep similar distance from the absolute truth by emphasizing the historiticity of understanding and the openness of hermeneutic experience, and neither stops at claiming himself to be a Hedeggerian only. Instead, both attempt to move from Heidegger's radical ontology back to different types of "the science of spirit" (Geisteswissenschaften), offering their own defense for the unique truth of the science of spirit.