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文艺理论研究 ›› 2018, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (5): 50-57.

• 西方文论与美学研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

康德的“Interesse”概念新探:对审美判断力第一要素的重新阐释

徐贤樑   

  1. 复旦大学中文系
  • 出版日期:2018-09-25 发布日期:2018-11-28
  • 作者简介:徐贤樑,复旦大学耶拿大学联合培养博士生,研究方向为德国观念论。
  • 基金资助:
    本文系国家留学基金委“2017年国家建设高水平公派留学项目”资助下的阶段性成果。

A Reinvestigation of Kant's Concept of "Interesse": A Reinterpretation of the Chief Element of the Power of Judgment

Xu Xianliang   

  1. Department of Chinese Language and Literature, Fudan University
  • Online:2018-09-25 Published:2018-11-28
  • About author:Xu Xianliang, is a joint Ph.D. student at Fudan University and Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, with research focused on German idealism.
  • Supported by:
    China Scholarship Council

摘要: 本文旨在分析康德的“Interesse”概念,讨论这个概念对理解《判断力批判》“美的分析”的重要意义。依据康德的规定,Interesse并不是指鉴赏者对美不感兴趣,而指是他在做出鉴赏判断时对审美对象的实际存在没有兴趣。在这一基本框架下,审美判断所内蕴的自由就被凸显出来,由于兴趣总是关系到对象的实际存在,因此在无兴趣的条件下,审美判断就摆脱了判断者任何的主观偏好。由此,鉴赏者才有权要求别人和自己做出相同的审美判断,并进而达成普遍的认同;而审美判断的自由特性同样构成了其与道德判断同构性的内在根据,在此基础上,美有资格成为德性的象征。

关键词: 康德, 兴趣, 普遍性, 象征

Abstract: This article takes Immanuel Kant's concept of "interesse", and investigates its meaning for understanding of Critique of the Power of Judgment. According to Kant, interesse does not mean that the judging subject is disinterested in beauty, but in the real existence of the object of judgment. Within such a frame, the freedom internal to aesthetic judgment is highlighted. Because interest always concerns the real object, aesthetic judgment without interest is free from subjective preference. Under such circumstances, the subject is entitled to the request of the same judgment from others and thus together they reach universal identity. The freedom is the basis of identity between judgment of taste and judgment of morality, and thus beauty is a symbol of morality.

Key words: Immanuel Kant, interest, universality, symbol

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